Twisting in the Wind: The Politics of Tepid Transitions to Renewable Energy. By Oksan Bayulgen. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2022. 310p. $80.00 cloth
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 21, Heft 2, S. 763-764
ISSN: 1541-0986
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In: Perspectives on politics, Band 21, Heft 2, S. 763-764
ISSN: 1541-0986
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 137, Heft 2, S. 424-426
ISSN: 1538-165X
In: Aklin, Michaël. 2021. Do high electricity bills undermine public support for renewables? Evidence from the European Union. Energy Policy, 156: 112400.
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In: Energy Research & Social Science, Forthcoming
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Working paper
In: Business and politics: B&P, Band 20, Heft 4, S. 523-552
ISSN: 1469-3569
AbstractClimate change mitigation relies increasingly on clean technologies such as renewable energy. Despite widespread success, further deployment of renewables has been met with resistance from voters and governments in several countries. How resilient is the renewable energy industry to adverse political events? I use the unexpected election of Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S. presidential race to study this question. As a vocal critic of renewables and a supporter of fossil fuels, his election is a plausible negative shock to the renewable energy sector. I examine stock market data to gauge the reaction of investors. I find that renewable energy stocks were adversely affected by the election. Overall, they experienced a cumulative abnormal loss in share values of about 6 percent on average over the twenty days that followed the election. However, I find that the negative effect is concentrated among non-U.S. firms. U.S. firms, on average, emerged unscathed. Non-U.S. companies, on the other hand, lost over 14 percent of their value in the aftermath of the election. This suggests that markets are more concerned by increasing obstacles to international business than a decrease of federal support for renewables.
In: Business & Politics, Forthcoming
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In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 64, Heft 4, S. 663-682
ISSN: 1573-1502
In: Environmental and Resource Economics, Forthcoming
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In: Global environmental politics, Band 23, Heft 1, S. 145-151
ISSN: 1536-0091
Abstract
Kennard and Schnakenberg (KS) raise three concerns regarding Aklin and Mildenberger ("Prisoners of the Wrong Dilemma: Why Distributive Conflict, Not Collective Action, Characterizes the Politics of Climate Change," Global Environmental Politics 20 (4): 4–27). In this response, we delineate where we agree and where we disagree with KS. We then consider whether the model presented by KS changes our assessment that free-riding concerns are not currently the binding constraint on global climate politics. We conclude with a refined statement of our original claim.
We investigate the consequences of a peaceful shift of power from one social group to another. Theoretically, we show that an individual's decision to stay put or migrate depends on the difference between the political preferences of groups and the change in tax. Empirically, we use the case of the unexpected creation of the Canton of Jura in Switzerland, which witnessed a power shift from German to French speakers in the 1970s. We find robust evidence supporting the model's predictions using data at the municipal and individual levels. Our research sheds light on population sorting in the shadow of power transitions.
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We investigate the consequences of a peaceful shift of power from one social group to another. Theoretically, we show that an individual's decision to stay put or migrate depends on the difference between the political preferences of groups and the change in tax. Empirically, we use the case of the unexpected creation of the Canton of Jura in Switzerland, which witnessed a power shift from German to French speakers in the 1970s. We find robust evidence supporting the model's predictions using data at the municipal and individual levels. Our research sheds light on population sorting in the shadow of power transitions.
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In: American journal of political science, Band 65, Heft 4, S. 971-987
ISSN: 1540-5907
AbstractCentral bank independence (CBI) solves the time inconsistency problem faced by policymakers with respect to monetary policy. However, it does not solve their underlying incentives to manipulate the economy for political gains. Unable to use monetary policy, and often limited in their ability to use fiscal spending, governments can resort to financial deregulation to generate short‐term political benefits. We show qualitatively and quantitatively that governments systematically weaken financial regulations in the aftermath of CBI, and that the effect of CBI is separate from an ideological shift toward liberalization. Our findings suggest that the growing financialization of the economy experienced by many countries over the last few decades is partly a by‐product of central bank independence.
In: Global Environmental Politics, Band 20, Heft 4, S. 2020
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In: Energy for Sustainable Development, Forthcoming
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